2 these GSS survey questions can predict real financial decisions on a micro-level, and they do. More positive answers to the GSS questions predict higher repayment and higher savings. In a third test, I find that individuals who contribute more in a Public Goods game are no more likely (or less likely) to repay their loans. The current literature examines the link between the GSS questions and the Trust game, and the GSS questions and real-life outcomes or decisions. This paper completes the circle by linking the Trust game directly to real-life decisions.
This project also provides insight into the determinants of default and savings for participants in a group banking project for the poor. Karlan (2004) finds that social connections, measured by geographic proximity and cultural similarity, cause lower default and higher savings due to improved monitoring or enforcement of group lending contracts. This paper finds support for an even simpler (albeit not contradictory) explanation of default: some individuals are fundamentally not trustworthy. This paper proceeds as follows: Section II discusses the literature on measuring trust and trustworthiness. Section III presents the games. Section IV presents the institutional setting of the lending and savings organization and the data. Section V presents the determinants of behavior in the games.
Section VI presents the predictions of future financial decisions. Section VII concludes.
I. MEASURING SOCIAL CAPITAL
Social capital can be construed on a group level (James S. Coleman, 1990 , Robert D. Putnam, 2000 or on an individual level (Edward L. Glaeser et al., 2002) . This paper examines whether experimental economics can be used to measure individual-level social capital. Individual-level social capital can be defined as the social skills and networks that enable an individual to overcome imperfect information problems and form contracts with others 3 . Trust and trustworthiness are two critical traits encompassed by individual social capital. Glaeser et al. (2000) finds the Trust game to correlate with history of prior interaction and cultural similarity, and also finds that more trusting individuals, as identified by the GSS 3 survey, behaved more trustworthily, but not more trusting, in the Trust game. This paper's key innovation is to establish a direct link from the trust game to a propensity to overcome a market failure (i.e., loan repayment).
The General Social Survey (GSS) contains three questions on "trust," "fairness" and "helping" which purport to measure social capital (Table 4 provides the wording). In cross-country regressions, several studies find that these GSS questions correlate with outcomes of interest. Knack and Keefer (1997) finds correlations with growth; Kennedy et al. (1998) and Lederman et al. (2002) with crime;
Brehm and Rahn (1997) with civic involvement; and, Fisman and Khanna (2000) with communication infrastructure.
II. THE GAMES
The Trust game was conducted as follows: First, before assigning the roles, all rules were explained to the participants. 4 All participants received three nuevos soles, were paired randomly, and assigned either an A or a B. 5 As pairings were announced, they could observe the identity of their partner but were separated immediately and hence had no opportunity to communicate. 6 The A's then had the opportunity to pass to the B's zero, one, two, or three of their coins. If A passed zero coins, the game ended. If A passed more than zero coins, the game administrator matched the amount passed. Then, B could pass back any number of coins to A and the game ended. Given the finite end, and assuming no future postgame consequences, the sub-game perfect equilibrium was for B to pass back nothing to A and hence for A to pass nothing to B.
Similar to Barr (2003) , who conducted this game in Zimbabwe, much care had to be taken to ensure that participants understood the game. The transactions for both parties were done face to face (and privately) with the game administrator. This risked that our presence influenced their decision, but 4 provided us the opportunity to confirm that each individual understood the rules. The basic results of the game are consistent with prior implementations of similar games in many respects. In all implementations, a significant portion of players contributed more than zero, the subgame perfect equilibrium.
A Public Goods game also was conducted with the same participants, in 41 groups. Each group contained individuals who participate in the group lending and savings program together. Group size varied from 9 to 29 based on attendance to the microfinance meeting the day of the game. The Public
Goods game typically was played before the Trust game, but the results were not revealed until after the participants had played the Trust game. 8 All rules were explained publicly, but with no opportunity to discuss the game. Each participant was given one coin. Privately, each individual then either gave the administrator back the coin or did not. If the administrator received 80 percent or more of the coins back, then everyone was given two coins. Group contribution rates ranged from 55.6 to 100 percent and averaged 80.7%.
III. THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING AND THE DATA
A. FINCA
The games were conducted with 864 members of FINCA, a non-profit "village banking" organization in Ayacucho, Peru. 9 FINCA provides four-month loans to groups of 30 poor women to help them expand their individual small businesses. 10 FINCA also encourages them to save (although the savings serve as collateral for the group loans). Although each individual has her own loan, each is also ultimately responsible for the repayment of the others as well. Everyone borrows at the same time, and nobody can get a new loan until all prior loans are paid in full. Women meet weekly at the FINCA office to make loan 7 Furthermore, the percentage returned by B does not predict how much A passes. Hence, A is not "savvy" in simply knowing which B's will return and which will not. These results are not shown, but are available upon request. 8 This was done to mitigate interaction and learning effects between the two games. In this sense, the savings component is similar to a rotating savings and credit association (ROSCA).
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FINCA encourages clients to save, and these savings are at risk with their peers. Hence, to save with FINCA is to trust your peers to repay their loans. If a client defaults, the group takes the savings of that client and also typically bars the client from further participation. Exceptions occur. In the weekly meetings, FINCA employees explicitly encourage clients to develop solidarity, both to enhance their social capital as well as to monitor and enforce the loans.
Many individual clients (14 percent of individuals in this sample) do not borrow the maximum allowed, and in fact maintain larger savings than debt balances. The interest rate paid on the loans is significantly higher than the interest earned on the savings (96 percent annually versus 9 percent annually, on average). This behavior is difficult to explain. Qualitative data suggest three stories dominate: (1) mental accounting: these savings are designated for a particular purpose or sense of security, (2) a commitment: the required repayment effectively commits the individual to invest the cash rather than consume it (Carol C. Bertaut and Michael Haliassos, 2002, David Laibson et al., 2002) , and (3) individuals value the option of future leverage. Regardless of the motivation, these individuals have not maximized their debt, and for this reason I label them as financially "cautious." I will examine whether individuals who do not maximize their debt behave distinctly in the Trust game.
B. The Data
The data come from three sources: an individual survey conducted privately, an individual survey conducted publicly, and financial savings and loan data. A private fifteen-minute survey was conducted with each individual, typically before the game was played. The second survey was conducted publicly 11 See Besley, Coate and Loury (1993) for a description and analysis of ROSCAs.
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with the whole group on questions about the existing and prior relationships between individuals in a group. Since the answers to these questions were known to many, this process elicited more truthful answers and ensured that questions were answered consistently. Third, one year after playing the game I gathered the savings and loan outcome data. Table 2 presents summary statistics.
IV. DETERMINANTS OF BEHAVIOR IN THE GAMES
A. The Trust Game Player A's behavior as "trust" and Player B's behavior as "trustworthy." Table 3 shows the analysis of the determinants of behavior in the Trust game. The OLS specification is as follows:
where Y i is the percentage passed to the other player of the amount possible to pass. The determinants are categorized threefold: individual characteristics (X i ), pair characteristics (P i ), and group characteristics (G i ). The individual characteristics encompass basic demographics. The pair characteristics encompass the relationship between the individual and her partner (e.g., cultural similarity, geographic proximity, and church attendance). Group characteristics encompass aggregated measures of the geographic and cultural dispersion of the group. Geographic proximity to each other predicts trusting and trustworthy behavior. If Player B lives within a 10-minute walk of Player A, then Player A passes 9 percentage points more to Player B (significant at 95 percent). The analog for Player B is 6 percentage points, but is not significant statistically. For Player B, however, the further she lives from all other members of the group (not just the partner), the less she returns to Player A (significant at 95 percent). This could be construed as trustworthiness or fear of reprisal. In this sense, trustworthiness is driven by fear of reprisal rather than innate personal characteristics.
Attending the same church also predicts trusting, but not trustworthy behavior. All participants were asked which church they attend "most frequently." In both Ayacucho and Huanta, there is one church that is the largest and most frequently attended. A dummy was set equal to one if two people reported attending the same church, but not the largest church. 13 Player A passes 20 percentage points more to Player B if both attend the same church (but not the largest one). Other results for religious activities, such as number of days since last attendance, no attendance, or evangelical affiliation (not shown) are insignificant statistically.
Of the 397 pairings, 98 were in separate lending and savings groups. Being in the same group as your partner should suggest that the clients expect to interact with each other in the future and also suggests they know each other beforehand. The coefficient on a dummy variable for being in the same group is positive for Player B and negative for Player A, but in neither case statistically significant. The GSS questions discussed earlier predict trustworthy (significant at 90 percent), but not trusting, behavior (contrary to the way the questions are worded). This particular finding is consistent with Glaeser et al. (2000) and particularly important since the questions are a leading alternative for measuring social capital. Other measures of social interaction, such as attending each other's celebrations and recalling group members' names, predict neither trusting nor trustworthy behavior. cultural similarity to the group (the more similar to the group, the more likely to have received a pass),
being Western (less likely to have received a pass), and having borrowed from others in the group outside of the official lending program (more likely to have received a pass). This last finding suggests that the most untrusted individuals might in fact be omitted from the analysis on Player B.
B. The Public Goods Game Table 3 Columns 6 and 7 report the determinants of behavior in the Public Goods game. Column 6 reports the OLS linear probability results. The basic specification is as follows:
where Y i is equal to 1 if the player contributed to the public good and 0 otherwise. The determinants can be divided twofold: the individual characteristics (X i ) and the connectedness to the group variables (G i ).
For the group-level analysis (Column 7), the dependent variable is the percentage of the group that contributed to the public good. Due to degrees of freedom, only a few independent variables are used.
Those who pass more in the Trust game are more likely to contribute to the public good 16 .
Individuals who have more instances borrowing directly from their peers are more likely to contribute to 15 A strategy method would have avoided this problem, but the education and literacy level of the participants did not permit such an approach. 16 This is true for both Players A and B, although the specification reported in 
V. PREDICTING FINANCIAL DECISIONS
If the Trust game can be taken seriously, then it should be able to predict future behavior. The heart of this paper links the borrowing and saving data to the Trust game data, and then tests whether behavior in the games predicts real financial decisions up to one year later. I test several hypotheses: (1) individuals who return more as Player B are trustworthy and hence should be more likely to repay their loans, (2) individuals who pass more as Player A are more trusting (gambling) and hence should save more (less),
individuals who contribute more to public goods should be better participants of their group, and hence default less and save more, and (4) those who answer the GSS questions affirmatively are more likely to repay their loans and save more.
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I use three outcomes: default on the loan, dropped out due to default or discipline (self-reported by the group), and total voluntary savings. Table 4 reports the results with each cell representing a separate specification. For each outcome, the analysis is conducted first as a simple OLS in Columns 1, 4
and 7 (or probit in the case of dropout), then in Columns 2, 5 and 8 I include controls for many of the known predictors of financial outcomes (Dean S. Karlan, 2004) . By adding the covariates, I am able to examine whether the Trust game predicts financial decisions after controlling for the observable, more traditional, predictors of trust and trustworthiness. Indeed, the results remain when adding the covariates.
In particular, the tests of the Trust game include controls for the responses to the GSS questions. Results are robust to including these controls; hence, the Trust game predictions are not a result merely of their 11 correlation with the GSS questions.
Panels A and B show the results for the Trust game for Players A and B, respectively. The predictions for trustworthiness, for Player B, support the hypothesis: the more trustworthy the individual, the lower the default, the less likely to drop-out, and the higher the voluntary savings (significant at 95 percent). The magnitudes of these results are significant as well: a shift from 25 to 50 percent for percent returned by Player B (trustworthiness) predicts a 6.1 percent point drop in the probability of dropout due to default or discipline (Panel B, Column 5) and a 7.4 19 percent point drop in the probability of default.
However, the results for trusting behavior, Player A, are exactly opposite. The more "trusting" the player, the lower the total voluntary savings and the more likely she is to drop out for default or discipline (but not significantly more likely to have higher default whether the player is in the same group as the partner. I interact the game behavior with a dummy if the partners are in the same group, and then examine whether the straight term or interaction term predicts the financial decision. If the interaction term is predictive, this suggests that the game is not measuring something about the personality of those individuals, but rather about the dynamics of the group process and the future punishment from continued interaction with the partner. Table 4 Columns 3, 6 and 9 show these results. For both Player A and B, for all financial decisions, the interaction term is not significant and the results remain robust for the straight term, percent passed in the Trust game. Table 4 Panel C shows the results for the Public Goods game. This game has no predictive power.
The point estimates are close to zero, so the lack of predictive power does not seem to be merely a lack of statistical precision. While the Public Goods game has no predictive power in this context, it would be interesting to observe its predictive power in a more direct and related link, for instance production of local public goods such as schools, wells, or health clinics. Table 4 , Panels D and E show the results for the GSS questions. Answering affirmatively to the questions relative to society as a whole is negatively correlated with default and dropping out due to default or discipline (significant at 99 percent). The questions do not, however, predict savings behavior.
In other words, the GSS questions predict default, or trustworthy actions, but fail to predict savings, or trusting actions. This matches with the findings reported in Table 3 that the GSS questions predict Player B, but not Player A, behavior in the Trust game.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper demonstrates that even though behavior in the Trust game might correlate intuitively with other measures of social capital, using it as a measure of social capital alone deserves further research, with particular attention paid to the motives behind Player A's actions. Although trust is almost by construction risky, when the social capital literature discusses trust it is not referring to gamblers per se, but rather to an ability for social norms and relationships to mitigate risks inherent in informal contracts.
The prior literature on the Trust game claims it measures trust for Player A and trustworthiness 13 for Player B. I find evidence that Player A measures propensity to take risks. I also find evidence to support the social capital or "trust" hypothesis (e.g., both players being indigenous, living near their partner, and attending the same church lead to higher passes by Player A). Hence, behavior is determined by both types of traits. This murkiness raises doubts about the ability to use the game as a measure purely of trust.
Trustworthiness, on the other hand, does not suffer from this murkiness, as I find strong support for using Player B's behavior as a measure of trustworthiness. It is useful to distinguish innate trustworthiness versus trustworthiness driven by a fear of reprisal. Specifically I find evidence supporting the game as a measure of innate individual-specific trustworthiness, not just a method of identifying individuals more sensitive to social sanctions (since Player B's action predicts financial decisions irrespective of whether the individual played against someone in their own group or against someone from another group). The positive correlation between trustworthiness in the game and answers to GSS questions relative to society (but not relative to others in their group) further suggests that the link is driven by underlying personal characteristics. However, living closer to one's partner was correlated with returning more in the game, hence there is some evidence that the fear of reprisal did partly determine Player B behavior. Naturally, the correct answer is probably a combination of the two.
By testing experimental economics in a real setting where social capital is purported to matter, two important points are made. First, a simple Trust game can indeed predict repayment of a loan enforced almost entirely through social pressure. This endorses experimental economics as a valid measurement tool for field research, and the Trust game as a valid method to measure trustworthiness, but not as a method to measure trust. Second, it demonstrates that trustworthiness is an important component in determining the success of group lending programs. Although these data do not show whether trustworthiness can be created, they do suggest that if harnessed and/or identified, lenders can help solve failures observed in the financial markets for the poor. Table 1a  Trust Game  Basic Results   Table 1b tab Player B Both players given 3 coins. Each coin is worth 1 Peruvian Nuevo Sol, which is worth US$0.29. Player A allowed to pass 0, 1, 2, or 3 coins to Player B. Game administrator doubles Player A's pass to Player B. Player B can pass back to Player A 0-100 percent of the coins received. Ru explained to both players publicly, in the same room, before assignment of individuals to Player A and B. Rules explained in both Spanish and Quechua. Players cannot communicate, but players are informed of the identity of their partner. Table 2 Summary Statistics Standard errors reported in parentheses. Sample sizes differ because data come from different sources and surveys. Financial data are from the FINCA-Peru management information system. All surveys conducted between January 2000 and April 2000. Demographic data come from individual surveys conducted with each member (except for education, which comes from the FINCA-Peru management information system). Social Interaction Data collected in survey conducted with each group as a whole (i.e., not privately, but with each person answering each question publicly). General Social Survey Questions answered privately in individual survey with field research team. Religious Data collected also collected privately in individual surveys with field research team. Group and Individual Interviews (except religion survey) conducted before the Trust Game and Public Goods Game were played with each group. The Religion Survey was conducted six months after the games were played. Distance measured as simple linear distance between two points on a two-dimensional map. Cultural binary variables ("indigenous" and "western") were determined by observing four characteristics of each individual, hair style, clothes, values reported for probit coefficients in columns 4, 5 & 6. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the group level (41 groups). *** 99% significance; ** 95% significance; * 90% significance. Columns 1, 2 & 3 examine whether behavior in the Trust game (Panel A & B), the Public Goods game (Panel C) and the GSS questions (Panel D & E) predict default one year later. The GSS questions are as follows: the trust question, "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?", the fairness question, "Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?", and the helpful question, "Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?" Default is defined as the amount unpaid by the borrower on her loan to FINCA one year after playing the game. Columns 4, 5 & 6 predict being dropped from the program due to default or discipline. This is considered a perhaps less noisy measure of "bad" default, since some default can be observed by group members as acceptable and hence forgiven. Columns 7, 8 & 9 examine predictors of voluntary savings. Columns 3, 6, & 9 examine whether behavior in the trust game predicts the bank outcome differently for individuals who are in the same lending group as their partner in the Trust game. Specifications with control variables include all variables included in Table 3 . Marginal 
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